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This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (work-
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1. Introduction
In a general matching problem, a set of agents has to be matched, either to some
other set of agents (two-sided matching), or to itself (one-sided matching). Gale and
Shapley [1962] wrote a now classical paper in which they considered the two basic
models of one-to-one matching (\marriage markets") and many-to-one matching
(labor markets). Their paper generated a vast literature, and especially in the last
two decades the number of contributions and researchers in the eld has grown
very fast: hundreds, if not thousands, of theory papers, empirical studies, laboratory
We thank Rob Irving, Bettina Klaus, David Manlove and three referees for very useful comments
and suggestions.
ySupported by OTKA grant K69027 and by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under its Mo-
mentum Programme (LD-004/2010).
zFinancial support from Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2008{04784), the Consolider-Ingenio 2010
(CSD2006{00016) program, the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and the Government of
Catalonia (SGR2009{01142) is gratefully acknowledged.
1
experiments, and three text books1 studied matching problems. Apart from the text
books, some surveys2 have reviewed parts of the matching literature. Last but not
least, the number of applications (labor markets, school choice, kidney exchange,
etc.) has made the eld of interest to market designers, policy makers, and the
public in general.3
In this survey, we focus on a particular but important branch of many-to-one
two-sided matching, motivated by a feature of many entry-level labor markets.
This feature is the presence of couples whose members each look for a job in the
same market. A couple faces a dicult coordination problem since it has to nd a
\good" pair of jobs. Hence, the agents' preferences contain complementarities. Most
matching markets studied in the literature consider agents' preferences to be free
of complementarities. It turns out that introducing complementarities, such as the
presence of married couples, changes a great deal the properties of the market.
The extent to which the presence of couples causes complications can possibly be
most easily illustrated in the case of centralized labor markets. In such centralized
matching schemes, the participants submit their preferences to the market orga-
nizer and an automated mechanism produces a matching. Ideally, the mechanism
is incentive compatible and its outcomes satisfy certain desirable properties related
to welfare, optimality, etc. that are studied in the economics and game theory lit-
erature. When couples are present, the existence of \desirable" matchings can no
longer be guaranteed. The automated mechanism of a centralized scheme is usu-
ally realized by a computer program, which should be able to compute an outcome
eciently for any possible input of preference lists. The computational tractabil-
ity of mechanism design problems is intensively studied in the computer science
literature. When couples are present, and even if \desirable" matchings do exist,
the problem of nding such a matching is no longer tractable. Therefore, the study
of matching markets with couples is profoundly dierent from matching markets
without couples. It also calls for an interdisciplinary approach to tackle the hurdles
just described. Obviously, improving our knowledge regarding this complementarity
is a rst step to dealing with other complementarities as well.
In Section 2 we rst give a short overview of the most important results in
matching without couples. This makes the survey self-contained and facilitates an
easy comparison with Section 3, where we review recent contributions to the study
of matching markets with couples. Section 4 concludes. Finally, two remarks are
1The rst book was written by Knuth [1976] with a focus on computational aspects. The second
book by Guseld and Irving [1989] studied stable matching problems from a graph and algorithm
theoretical point of view. The third book was written by Roth and Sotomayor [1990] and mainly
describes structural and game-theoretical ndings.
2The survey by Roth [2008] focused on Gale and Shapley's (1962) celebrated deferred acceptance
algorithm. The survey by Klijn [2008] focused on recent developments in school choice, which
has turned out to be a fruitful application of matching theory. Sonmez and Unver [2011] and
Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [2010] dealt with several models of both one-sided and two-sided
matching. Finally, Kojima and Troyan [2011] focused on market design issues in matching markets.
3We refer to Al Roth's website and market design blog for further discussion.
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in order. First, in view of the main applications, we have opted to use mainly the
terminology of students/residents and hospitals. Second, we have purposely omitted
most formal denitions: they would require substantial additional space without
clear benets for most non-specialized readers.
2. Matching Without Couples
There are two nite and disjoint sets of agents: a set S of single students (or resi-
dents) and a set H of hospitals. For each hospital h, there is a xed quota qh that
represents the number of positions it oers.4
Each student has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation over the
hospitals and the prospect of being unmatched. Hence, student s's preferences can
be represented by a strict ordering Ps of the elements in H[fsg, where the element
s represents being unmatched. Hospital h is acceptable to student s if s prefers h
to s.
Each hospital has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation over the
individual students and the prospect of getting no residents. Hence, hospital h's
preferences over individual students can be represented by a strict ordering Ph of
the elements in S [ f;g. Student s is acceptable to hospital h if h prefers s to ;. A
set of students S0  S is feasible for hospital h if jS0j  qh. Each hospital h has a
complete and transitive preference relation over feasible sets of students, which can
be represented by a weak ordering P h of the elements in P(S; qh) := fS0  S : jS0j 
qhg. A widely used assumption in the literature is that P h is a responsive extension5
of Ph. This connects the preferences over sets of students with the preferences over
individual students in the following way. Given a set of students, an improvement
is obtained by (i) replacing a student by a better student, or (ii) lling an empty
position with an acceptable student. (In other words, each hospital ranks a student
independently of his colleagues.) By responsiveness, P h coincides with Ph on the set
of individual students. Note also that Ph allows for multiple responsive extensions.
A (matching) market is a triple (S;H; P ), where P = (PS ; P

H). A matching for
market (S;H; P ) is a function  on the set S [H that species which students are
matched to which hospitals. Formally,
 for all s 2 S, either (s) 2 H or (s) = s;
 for all h 2 H, (h) 2 P(S; qh);
 for all s 2 S and h 2 H, (s) = h if and only if s 2 (h).
A matching  is individually rational if any student and any hospital that are
matched to one another are mutually acceptable. If a student s and a hospital h
are not matched to one another in a matching , but the student would prefer to
be matched to the hospital and the hospital would prefer to either add the student
4The marriage model is the special case of one-to-one matching, where for all h 2 H, qh = 1.
5See Roth [1985] and Roth and Sotomayor [1990] for a discussion of this assumption.
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or replace another student by student s, then we would expect the pair (s; h) to
block the matching, i.e., carry out the mutually benecial adjustment. A matching
is stable if it is individually rational and there are no blocking pairs.6 Stability is
a key property of matchings. Apart from its theoretical appeal, empirical studies
have found that in many centralized labor markets, clearinghouses are most often
successful if they produce stable matchings.7 Since stability does not depend on
the particular responsive extensions of the hospitals' preferences over individual
students, a matching market is henceforth a triple (S;H; P ), or simply P , where P =
(PS ; PH). In view of stability, we can (and often do) omit, without loss of generality,
the unacceptable hospitals and sets of students from the agents' preference lists.
2.1. Existence of Stable Matchings and Optimality
The famous deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm (Gale and Shapley [1962]) yields
a stable matching.8 Let P = (PS ; PH) be a preference prole (of preferences over
individual agents). The student-proposing DA algorithm applied to P , denoted by
DA(P ) for short, nds a matching through the following steps.9
Step 1: Each student s proposes to the hospital that is ranked rst in Ps (if there
is no such hospital then s remains single). Each hospital h considers its proposers
and tentatively assigns its qh positions to these students one at a time following the
preferences Ph. All other proposers are rejected.
Step k, k  2: Each student s that is rejected in Step k   1 proposes to the
next hospital in his list Ps (if there is no such hospital then s remains single). Each
hospital h considers the students it has been holding together with its new proposers
and tentatively assigns its qh positions to these students one at a time following the
preferences Ph. All other proposers are rejected.
The algorithm stops when no student is rejected. Then, all tentative matches become
nal. With some abuse of notation, let (P ) denote the matching. Gale and Shapley
[1962] proved that matching (P ) is stable with respect to preference prole P .
Moreover, they also showed (one-side) optimality: (P ) is the best (worst) stable
matching for the students (hospitals) with respect to preference prole P .
Taking the requirement of stability as granted, an important question is whether
the choice of a particular stable mechanism aects the numerical distribution of stu-
dents; and if not, whether it aects the composition of the hospitals that do not ll
all their vacant positions. For instance, Sudarshan and Zisook [1981] observed that
6It is not necessary to consider any other possible blocking coalition since the existence of such a
blocking coalition implies the existence of a blocking pair (see for instance, Roth and Sotomayor
[1990], Lemma 5.5). Also, the set of stable matchings coincides with the core dened by weak
domination (see for instance, Roth and Sotomayor [1990], Proposition 5.36).
7See, for instance, Roth [1984b], Roth [1990], Roth [1991], and Roth and Xing [1994].
8We refer to Roth [2008] for a history on the deferred acceptance algorithm.
9Note that the DA algorithm does not depend on the particular responsive extensions.
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in the US market of medical graduates the National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP) fails to ll the posts of many rural hospitals. Roth [1984a] and Roth [1986]
showed that the problem of the rural hospitals cannot be attributed to the NRMP's
particular stable mechanism, since the number of assignees is the same for every
hospital in each stable matching. Moreover, a hospital that does not ll its quota
in all stable matchings gets the same assignees in each stable matching.
Many matching markets, and in particular job markets, work in a decentralized
way. This means that the agents contact each other randomly and they form new
pairs (and possibly break old ones) whenever this is in their interest (it is assumed
that the market is exible; the costs of (re-)contracting can be neglected). Knuth
[1976] posed the question whether the above stochastic process converges to a stable
matching. Roth and Vande Vate [1990] showed that there always exists a path
to stability in one-to-one matching markets, implying that the stochastic process
converges to a stable matching with probability one. This result has been extended
for many-to-one markets by Kojima and Unver [2006]. However, real markets are
not completely exible, and even if they were, the time10 and eorts needed to reach
a stable solution in a medium-size market are signicant. Therefore, in many large
markets, especially when the matching is due to be created in a short time interval
(e.g., for resident allocation and student admissions), centralized matching schemes
are used.
2.2. Eciency and Incentive Compatibility in Centralized Markets
Two important desirable properties for centralized matching schemes are computa-
tional tractability and incentive compatibility. They are compatible with stability if
the students are the only strategic agents: the DA algorithm induces a mechanism
that satises the rst and the restricted second additional requirements.
The DA algorithm can be implemented in linear time (see, e.g., Knuth [1976]).
This means that the running time of the algorithm is proportional to the number
of applications in the scheme. For example, the algorithm used in the Hungarian
higher education matching scheme calculates a student-optimal stable matching11
in 10 seconds for about 150,000 applicants. The linear running time suggests that
the same method could be eciently used in any other country (including higher
education admissions in China, where a scoring system similar to that of Hungary
is used). Note that even a quadratic time algorithm would very likely be too slow
for such large scale applications.
The other important property of the DA-algorithm is incentive compatibility.
Roth [1985] proved that under the direct-revelation mechanism induced by  it is
a weakly dominant strategy for the students to reveal their true preferences. So, no
10Ackermann et al. [2008] showed that the expected time of convergence to a stable matching may
be exponential in two-sided matching markets.
11This application has some special features (see Biro [2008] and Biro, Fleiner, Irving and Manlove
[2010]), but the automated mechanism of the scheme is based on the DA algorithm.
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student has incentives to misrepresent his preferences.12 However, it is not possible
to ensure incentive compatibility for both sides of (one-to-one) markets as Roth
[1982] showed that any stable mechanism is manipulable via preference lists: there
is always some participant for whom reporting a true preference list is not a best
response to the other participants' reported preferences. Furthermore, in many-
to-one markets we cannot even obtain incentive compatibility for the side of the
hospitals. Even the hospital-proposing variant of the DA algorithm (which induces
a hospital-optimal stable matching) is not immune to manipulation from hospitals
(see Roth [1985]).
Sonmez [1997] and Sonmez [1999] showed that if hospitals have more than one
slot then there are additional strategic concerns. First, any stable mechanism is
manipulable via capacities, i.e., hospitals may sometimes benet by underreporting
their quotas. Second, any stable mechanism is manipulable via prearranged matches,
i.e., a hospital and a student may benet by agreeing to match before receiving their
allocations from the centralized matching mechanism.
2.3. Large Centralized Markets
Roth and Peranson [1999] conducted simulations based on data from the NRMP.
They found suggestive evidence that in large markets the set of stable matchings
is likely to be very small and that stable matching mechanisms are dicult to
manipulate. A key assumption in their analysis is that the length of students' pref-
erence lists is bounded as market size grows. Motivated by the ndings of Roth
and Peranson [1999], Immorlica and Mahdian [2005] and Kojima and Pathak [2009]
analyzed the scope for manipulation in one-to-one and many-to-one matching mar-
kets, respectively, under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number
of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions (including the bounded
preference lists of the students), they showed that the fraction of participants with
incentives to misrepresent their preferences when the others are truthful approaches
zero as the market becomes large. Moreover, if the market is suciently \thick,"
truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium.
3. Matching With Couples
In this section we consider matching markets where couples are present. We rst
describe some of the most important real-life matching schemes involving couples.
Then, we explain through several simple situations why and how the stability con-
cept can be generalized in dierent ways to the extended model with couples. How-
ever, no matter the precise denition, the set of stable matchings can be empty and
no longer satises several desirable structural properties. Also, the problem of nd-
ing a stable matching is computationally hard. Next, we compare some heuristics
12In other words, the mechanism is strategy-proof for the students.
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that are used in practice. We also discuss the papers that have considered pref-
erence domain restrictions (but nonetheless have obtained several negative results
regarding structural properties of the set of stable matchings). Finally, we describe
some very recent results for large markets with couples.
3.1. Applications
In the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) couples can submit joint
preference lists over pairs of positions since 1983. Before that, they could only
submit individual preferences for each spouse and assign priority to one spouse.
But even after this change, the participation of married couples in the program was
very low (see Roth [1984b]). However, in 1995{1998 the program was successfully
redesigned by Roth and Peranson [1999]. One of the important issues that triggered
the redesign was the presence of couples. Since the redesign of the NRMP, a number
of similar applications in the US have adopted the method (see Roth [2008] for a
summary).
In Scotland, the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) has been re-
sponsible for the allocation of residents to hospitals since 2000. Since 2010 a pair of
residents can indicate that they wish to be treated as a couple. A couple submits
individual preference lists and then a joint preference list is created automatically
from them in a very specic way, keeping only those pairs of positions that are lo-
cated in hospitals geographically close to each other. At the same time, all residents
are ranked at each hospital according to a common scoring method. Hence, there
is a so-called \master list" of resident scores (see Biro, Irving and Schlotter [2011]
for more details).
The US Navy assignment process involves hundreds of thousands of sailors to
be assigned, commands seeking sailors and detailers who advise both sailors and
commands. According to recent studies (see Short [2000], Robards [2001], and Yang,
Giampapa and Sycaratech [2003]), the three most important requirements for an
optimal assignment of sailors to billets are the following. The matching should be
stable; it should accommodate the wishes of married couples; and it should ensure
that all sailors are assigned to a position and that certain critical positions are lled.
Although there is no publicly available description of the algorithm used in this (or
any similar) program, it is clear that the presence of couples plays an important
role.13
In the Hungarian higher education matching scheme, students apply for studies
via a centralized program since 1985. The matching mechanism is based on a sta-
13Note that if we consider the third requirement primordial and take only one of the other two
requirements, then we already end up with an NP-hard problem. If we omit the stability require-
ment and aim to nd a maximum size matching with couples then the problem is NP-hard (see
Biro and McDermid [2010] and Marx and Schlotter [2011]). If we neglect the wishes of couples
and try to nd a maximum size matching with a minimum number of blocking pairs, then the
problem becomes again NP-hard (see Biro, Manlove and Mittal [2010]).
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ble score-limit algorithm, which is a generalization of the DA algorithm (see Biro
[2008]). Apart from the issue of ties (i.e., when there are students with identical
scores), there are at least two other special features in the scheme. Universities
and colleges not only have dierent kinds of common (upper) quotas, but they can
also set lower quotas for each study (see Biro, Fleiner, Irving and Manlove [2010]).
Finally, students can apply for pairs of MSc studies, which are special studies for
future teachers. For instance, in 2010, 5,578 students applied for teachers' studies
and 2,091 of them applied for pairs of studies. The matching problem is essentially
the same as the one in matching markets with couples, since students applying to
pairs of studies act like couples in resident allocation programs. The proportion
of paired applications is very high since they are crucial in pursuing a successful
teaching career.
3.2. Stability: Denitions
If each hospital has only one position then the stable matching problem in markets
with couples can be formulated in terms of a hedonic coalition formation game14
as follows. The single applicants, the couples, and the hospitals are the players and
each coalition corresponds to a possible contract between a single applicant and a
hospital or between a couple and a pair of hospitals. The preferences of the hospitals
over the possible contracts are derived from their preferences over the individual
candidates who would be assigned to them under the contracts. A stable matching
in a market with couples is equivalent to a core element in the above dened NTU-
game. More precisely, an individually rational matching is not stable if there is a
blocking pair (consisting of a single applicant and a hospital) or a blocking coalition
(consisting of a couple and two hospitals) whose members would all be better of by
signing a new contract and possibly breaking existing ones.
If hospitals have multiple positions but no couple applies for a pair of positions at
the same hospital, then the extension of the stability denition is straightforward.15
However, if hospitals have multiple positions and couples are allowed to apply to
a pair of positions at the same hospital, then dierent denitions of stability are
possible.16 Assuming hospitals have responsive preferences we know how they would
decide between two single candidates, but it is not obvious how they would rank
a single applicant with respect to a couple, or how they would rank two couples.
14See Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] for a denition of hedonic coalition formation games. To
be precise, we can model a market with couples as a coalition formation game only if there is no
couple that applies to a pair of hospitals in two ways (i.e., (h; h0) and (h0; h)). In the general case,
the matching problem can be formulated in terms of an NTU-game, where the core corresponds
to the set of stable matchings.
15Here again, the set of stable matchings coincides with the core dened by weak domination.
16The complexities with multiple positions have not been considered until lately. The only papers
that mention this issue are Kojima, Pathak and Roth [2010], McDermid and Manlove [2010], Marx
and Schlotter [2011], and Biro, Irving and Schlotter [2011]. Both the NRMP and the SFAS allow
couples to apply to a pair of positions at the same hospital.
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Below, we describe three critical situations that illustrate the basic dierences in
the possible denitions of stability.17
In the rst situation we have a hospital h with two positions, a single applicant,
s2, and a couple (s1; s3). Hospital h prefers s1 to s2 and s2 to s3. The hospital
can decide to admit either the couple or the single applicant. Both decisions can
be rational, depending on the matching scheme. In Scotland, the single applicant
would be selected. The reason behind this decision is the following. In Scotland, the
residents are ranked in each hospital according to a common scoring system and a
matching mechanism provides score limits for each hospital such that admitting a
new single applicant or a couple by rejecting some other assignees cannot decrease
this score limit (more about this in Biro, Irving and Schlotter [2011]). Based on
the stability denition18 given in the paper by Kojima, Pathak and Roth [2010],
the single applicant would be chosen, therefore supposedly this solution would be
returned in the NRMP as well.19 This is because the preference of each hospital is
assumed to be responsive, and hence the choice of h from the set fs1; s2; s3g would
be fs1; s2g. So, the single applicant can block with the hospital if it is not matched,
but the couple cannot. However, in the two other papers where this option (i.e.,
having applications from a couple for pairs of positions at the same hospital) has
been considered (McDermid and Manlove [2010] and Marx and Schlotter [2011]),
the opposite assumption has been made, namely that the couple would be selected.
Note that this assumption can be equally reasonable, since admitting (s1; s3) instead
of s2 can be seen as an improvement for the hospital, as s1 is better than s2 and it
is also better to ll the empty slot with s3 than leaving it unlled.
The second critical situation is when two couples, (s1; s4) and (s2; s3), apply for
two positions at the same hospital h, where there are exactly two positions. The
candidates are ranked by the hospital in the following order: s1Phs2Phs3Phs4 (i.e.,
s1 is the best and s4 is the worst candidate). Either of the two possible matchings
may be considered as stable, and actually both are stable according to the denitions
presented in Kojima, Pathak and Roth [2010], McDermid and Manlove [2010], and
Marx and Schlotter [2011]. However, in Biro, Irving and Schlotter [2011] the unique
stable matching matches (s2; s3). Essentially, in the SFAS every couple that applies
17For two reasons we do not provide the full formal denitions of stability for markets with couples.
First, the formal denitions would require a considerable amount of space without clear benets
for most non-specialized readers. Second, most results in the literature are negative and even hold
when each hospital has only one position (i.e., when all denitions of stability coincide).
18In Kojima, Pathak and Roth [2010], a necessary condition for a hospital h to form a blocking
pair with a single candidate s is s 2 Chh((h) [ fsg), and to form a blocking coalition with a
couple (s1; s2) is fs1; s2g  Chh((h) [ fs1; s2g). Here, Chh(S) denotes the choice of hospital h
from the set of residents S.
19The algorithm used in the NRMP is described in detail in Roth and Peranson [1999], we give a
short summary in Subsection 3.4. At this point we only note that in each step of this algorithm
either a single resident (or a couple) makes a proposal to a hospital (or to a pair of hospitals).
The proposal is accepted if and only if the resident forms a blocking pair with the hospital (or
the couple forms a blocking coalition with the hospital or pairs of hospitals) with respect to the
actual matching.
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for a pair of positions at the same hospital is ranked according to its weakest
member.
Finally, the third critical situation is when two couples, (s1; s3) and (s2; s4), ap-
ply for two positions at the same hospital h, and the applicants are again ranked ac-
cording to their indices. Both possible matchings are stable when stability is dened
as in Kojima, Pathak and Roth [2010]: the choice of h from the set fs1; s2; s3; s4g
would be fs1; s2g, so neither of the couples can form a blocking coalition with the
hospital when the other couple is matched there. However, one could argue that
having s1 instead of s2 and s3 instead of s4 are both strict improvements for the
hospital, so only fhs1; h1i ; hs3; h2ig should be considered stable. Actually, this is the
case in the other three papers mentioned above. Therefore, the stability condition
dened in Kojima, Pathak and Roth [2010] (and presumably used in the NRMP)
is the least restrictive among the four variants that are present in the literature.
3.3. Stability: (Loss of) Structure and Computational Complexity
In this subsection we provide a number of \simple" matching markets that illustrate
the diculties that may arise when extending the many-to-one model to account
for the presence of couples. In all our examples each hospital has only one position.
Therefore, our ndings are valid no matter which denition of stability we use from
the previously described literature.
The rst example, presented by Roth [2008] and accredited by him to Klaus and
Klijn [2005], describes an instance that does not admit a stable matching.20
Example 1. (No stable matching.) There are three residents, comprising one single
applicant s2, one couple (s1; s3) and two hospitals, each with one position. The applicants
are ordered by both hospitals according to their indices (s1 highest, s3 lowest), and the
preference lists of the residents are as shown in Figure 1. There are three non-empty match-
(s1; s3) : (h1; h2)
s2 : h1 h2
Fig. 1. A couples market without a stable matching.
ings for this instance: M1 = fhs1; h1i ; hs3; h2ig, M2 = fhs2; h2ig and M3 = fhs2; h1ig.
It may readily be veried that M1 is blocked by hs2; h2i, M2 by hs2; h1i, and M3 by
h(s1; s3); (h1; h2)i. 
The following basic example illustrates that in the presence of couples, the set
of stable matchings does not necessarily have extreme elements and nice structural
20Roth [1984b] and Marilda Sotomayor [unpublished note] were the rst to exhibit couples markets
without stable matchings.
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properties.21
Example 2. (No one-side optimality.) There are four residents, comprising two couples
(s1; s4) and (s2; s3), and two hospitals, each with one position. The applicants are ordered
by both hospitals according to their indices (s1 highest, s4 lowest), and the preference
lists of the residents are as shown in Figure 2. There are two stable matchings: 1 =
(s1; s4) : (h1; h2)
(s2; s3) : (h1; h2)
Fig. 2. A couples market without one-side optimality.
fhs1; h1i ; hs4; h2ig and 2 = fhs2; h1i ; hs3; h2ig, but neither of them is optimal for either
side of the market. (This follows since h1 and (s1; s4) prefer 1, but h2 and (s2; s3) prefer
2.) 
We can extend the previous example by adding a pair of positions to the end of
one joint preference list to show that the rural hospital theorem (Roth [1984a] and
Roth [1986]) does not carry over to markets with couples.22
Example 3. (No extension of the rural hospital theorem.) There are four residents,
comprising two couples (s1; s4) and (s2; s3), and four hospitals, each with one position. The
applicants are ordered by all hospitals according to their indices (s1 highest, s4 lowest),
and the preference lists of the residents are as shown in Figure 3. There are only two
(s1; s4) : (h1; h2)
(s2; s3) : (h1; h2) (h3; h4)
Fig. 3. A couples market with stable matchings of dierent sizes.
stable matchings fhs1; h1i ; hs4; h2i ; hs2; h3i ; hs3; h4ig and fhs2; h1i ; hs3; h2ig, and they
have dierent sizes. 
Combining the markets in Examples 1 and 2, we can easily construct another
market (with a stable matching) such that if we start from some unstable matching,
there is no path to a stable matching by consecutively satisfying blocking pairs.23
21Aldershof and Carducci [1996] were the rst to exhibit a couples markets with stable matchings
but without optimal stable matchings.
22Aldershof and Carducci [1996] were the rst to exhibit a couples markets with stable matchings
of dierent sizes.
23Klaus and Klijn [2007] were the rst to exhibit a couples markets (with a stable matching) where
there is an unstable matching from which there exists no path to a stable matching.
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Example 4. (No path to stability.) There are ve residents, comprising one single ap-
plicant s3 and two couples (s1; s5) and (s2; s4), and four hospitals, each with one position.
The applicants are ordered by all hospitals according to their indices (s1 highest, s5 low-
est), and the preference lists of the residents are as shown in Figure 4. There is a unique
(s1; s5) : (h1; h2)
(s2; s4) : (h1; h2) (h3; h4)
s3 : h3 h4
Fig. 4. A couples market without a path to stability.
stable matching fhs2; h1i ; hs4; h2ig. If we start with matching fhs1; h1i ; hs5; h2ig, then no
path of matchings obtained by satisfying blocking pairs leads to the stable matching. 
Finally, we illustrate with a similar example that there is no incentive compatible
mechanism that yields a stable matching whenever one exists.
Example 5. (No incentive compatibility + \stability whenever possible.") There
are ve residents, comprising one single applicant s3 and two couples (s1; s5) and
(s4; s2), and four hospitals, each with one position. The applicants are ordered by all
hospitals according to their indices (s1 highest, s5 lowest), and the preference lists of
the residents are as shown in Figure 5. There is a unique stable matching given by
(s1; s5) : (h1; h2)
(s4; s2) : (h1; h2) (h3; h4)
s3 : h1 h4
Fig. 5. A couples market with a unique stable matching.
fhs1; h1i ; hs5; h2i ; hs4; h3i ; hs2; h4ig, where s3 is unmatched. However, if s3 were to re-
place h1 with h2 in his preference list, then the unique stable matching for the manipu-
lated instance would be fhs4; h1i ; hs2; h2i ; hs3; h4ig. So, any mechanism that always yields
a stable matching whenever one exists violates incentive compatibility. 
Another piece of bad news for policy makers and mechanism designers is that it is
very unlikely that there is an ecient algorithm that always nds a stable matching
whenever one exists. Indeed, the problem of nding a stable matching in a market
with couples is NP-hard. This was rst proved by Ronn [1990] for markets where
each hospital has only one position. The same negative result has been proved for
even more restricted settings, namely McDermid and Manlove [2010] showed that
the problem of nding a stable matching is NP-hard even for \consistent" couples,
i.e., couples that apply only for pairs of positions at the same hospital. Furthermore,
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Biro, Irving and Schlotter [2011] showed that the problem is still NP-hard if the
residents are ranked according to a common order (or \master list") and the joint
list of each couple is constructed in a systematic way (which is how for instance the
SFAS proceeds).
The problem is also hard from a parameterized point of view when the number
of couples is the parameter considered. Marx and Schlotter [2011] proved that the
problem is so-called W [1]-hard, which means that there exists no FPT-algorithm
for this problem unless P=NP.24 Note that for the restricted problem setting that
is present in the SFAS, and which is still NP-hard, Biro, Irving and Schlotter [2011]
provide an FPT-algorithm.
Finally, there do exist some positive results for the special case where the set
of possible matchings is restricted to those which are stable with respect to the
individual preferences as well. Sethuraman, Teo and Qian [2006] and McDermid
and Manlove [2010] gave polynomial time algorithms for such problems in dierent
settings.
As most variants of the problems, and certainly all the variants that are present
in the current applications, are NP-hard, the mechanism designers can do nothing
but try dierent heuristics to solve the real instances. As we will see, computational
experiments show that the problem is relatively easy to solve in practice for resident
allocation schemes, where the proportion of couples is small (about 5%). However,
in other applications, where the proportion of couples is high, the problem seems
very challenging.
3.4. Heuristics
Since the National Resident Matching Program has been redesigned (see Roth and
Peranson [1999]), the matching algorithm that is used in the program is a heuristic
based on the incremental algorithm by Roth and Vande Vate [1990]. The idea of
the algorithm is that the applicants are added to the market one-by-one and the
matching regains stability after satisfying a bounded number of blocking pairs. The
algorithm that is used in the NRMP is very similar; the dierence is that couples
are also accommodated. The algorithm starts by adding all the single applicants
rst, and then the couples are added one-by-one with the hope that a stable solution
can be reached by the same proposal-rejection sequence for each sub-market. This
simple algorithm seems to work well for markets with a small proportion of couples
(see Roth and Peranson [1999]). However, in Klaus, Klijn and Masso [2007] it was
shown that (i) this method may not nd a stable solution, even if the instance
24An FPT-algorithm would have a running time f(c) g(n), where c is the number of couples, f(c)
is an arbitrary function of c and g(n) is a polynomial function of n, n being the size of the instance.
The existence of an FPT-algorithm might suggest that the problem can be tractable for instances
where the number of couples is small, even if the problem is NP-hard. However, W [1]-hardness
implies that the problem is practically intractable, even if the number of couples is small in a
matching scheme.
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satises some special properties that guarantee the existence of a stable solution
(see Subsection 3.5), and (ii) the induced mechanism is also vulnerable to strategic
manipulation.
Motivated by the practical challenge of constructing an algorithm for the SFAS,
Biro, Irving and Schlotter [2011] designed and implemented some \more complex"
algorithms and compared their performance with the NRMP-algorithm described
in Roth and Peranson [1999] by testing them on random samples. Their nding was
that most variants were able to return a stable matching for almost every instance
when the proportion of couples was low (around 5%). However, as the proportion
of couples increased the success rate of the new heuristics was clearly higher than
that of the Roth-Peranson algorithm.
There is a third approach described in a very recent paper by Biro, Fleiner and
Irving [2011], which uses the Scarf-algorithm (Scarf [1967]) to nd a stable match-
ing. Biro and Fleiner [2010] showed how the Scarf-algorithm can be employed to
nd fractional core solutions for NTU-games where agents can have capacities. As
a possible application, they illustrated how their theory can be applied to matching
markets with couples. The Scarf-algorithm always produces a stable fractional so-
lution (which can be interpreted as part-time contracts), and when the solution is
integral it corresponds to a stable matching. Biro, Fleiner and Irving [2011] imple-
mented and tested this method and compared its performance with the two above
mentioned algorithms for the same random samples that Biro, Irving and Schlotter
[2011] studied. The results of a particular experiment are shown in Table 1.
Number of couples
Algorithm 12 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
R{P (1999) 952 897 701 547 395 277 170 83 41 9 3
B{I{S (2011) 976 958 911 870 811 752 682 546 281 71 10
Scarf by B{F{I (2011) 895 813 649 532 426 356 316 261 202 174 158
Table 1. Randomly created matching markets with couples for 500 residents.
In this computational experiment, there were 500 residents and the proportion
of couples varied from 5% to 100%. For each proportion of couples, the authors
generated 1000 random instances and counted how many instances each variant
could solve. They considered the Roth-Peranson method (used in the NRMP), some
more sophisticated heuristics due to Biro, Irving and Schlotter [2011] (used in the
SFAS), and the Scarf-algorithm. The table shows that the heuristics due to Biro,
Irving and Schlotter [2011] obtained a much better success ratio than the Roth-
Peranson heuristics, especially for high proportions of couples. But surprisingly, the
Scarf-algorithm was much better than the others when (almost) all the applicants
form couples. Note that this situation occurs in some applications, such as the
Hungarian higher education matching scheme (where many applicants apply for a
pair of studies).
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Another possibility that has not been explored thoroughly is the application
of genetic algorithms to generate stable matchings. Aldershof and Carducci [1999]
provided such an algorithm. They applied their algorithm to some couples markets
of size 50. They noticed that their examples are much smaller than most real-world
problems, but the latter involve preference lists that are very short with respect to
the number of available choices (e.g., a resident ranks only a very small number of
hospital positions from the thousands of available ones). Considering some larger
instances with smaller number of applications, they found that genetic enumeration
of stable matchings in a market of size 2,000 can be accomplished in a relatively
short amount of time. This experiment led them to suggest that it could be possible
to use the genetic algorithm for markets of the size of the NRMP.
3.5. Restricted Preference Domains
One possible way to get around the non-existence of stable matchings is to consider
restricted preference domains for couples. Dutta and Masso [1997] considered a re-
striction that they called togetherness and proved the existence of a stable matching
using an adapted deferred acceptance algorithm. Unfortunately, togetherness is a
very strong restriction since it basically makes the couples behave like individual
students.
Klaus and Klijn [2005] introduced a natural preference domain for couples,
namely the domain of \(weakly) responsive" preferences, and showed that on this
domain stable matchings exist.25 A couple's preferences are responsive if the uni-
lateral improvement of one partner's job is considered benecial to the couple as
well. If responsiveness only applies to acceptable positions, then preferences are
weakly responsive. Hence, (weakly) responsive preferences may reect situations
where couples search for jobs in the same metropolitan area. They proved that un-
der a restricted unemployment aversion condition, the domain of weakly responsive
preferences is maximal for the existence of stable matchings.26
Hateld and Kojima [2010] introduced a condition called \bilateral substitutes"
in the matching with contracts framework of Hateld and Milgrom [2005]. Matching
with couples (where each hospital has only one position) is a special case of matching
with contracts. Hateld and Kojima [2010] proved that weak responsiveness implies
bilateral substitutes. Hence, their result that bilateral substitutes is sucient for
the existence of a stable matching subsumes the existence result in Klaus and Klijn
[2005]. Hateld and Kominers [2011] generalized the matching with contracts model
in Hateld and Milgrom [2005] to a many-to-many setting. One special case of the
more general model is matching with couples where hospitals can have more than
one position. The work in Hateld and Kominers [2011] showed that for hospitals
25See also Klaus, Klijn and Nakamura [2009].
26More precisely, in a couples market with only restricted strictly unemployment averse couples
and at least one couple whose preferences are not weakly responsive, there exist (weakly) responsive
preferences for the other couple(s) such that no stable matching exists.
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with substitutable preferences (i.e., instead of responsive preferences), the domain of
substitutable preferences is a maximal domain of couples' preferences under which
a stable matching is guaranteed to exist.
In a decentralized market, stable outcomes can always be reached provided that
couples' preferences are weakly responsive. Starting from an arbitrary matching,
Klaus and Klijn [2007] showed how to construct a path of matchings obtained from
\satisfying" blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.
Although on the domain of responsive preferences a stable matching always
exists, Klaus and Klijn [2005] showed that even on this domain other desirable
properties of stable matchings for singles markets do not carry over to couples
markets:
 there may be no optimal stable matching for either side of the market;
 dierent stable matchings may ll a dierent number of positions;
 there is no stable matching mechanism for which stating the true prefer-
ences is a dominant strategy for every couple.
One possible reason why couples' preferences might not satisfy weak responsive-
ness is geographic. For instance, if a couple's most preferred option is two hospitals
in one region and its second most preferred option is two hospitals in some other
region, then responsiveness is violated. Cantala [2004] considered a model with dif-
ferent regions of hospital locations and assumed that couples prefer to be matched in
the same region rather than in distinct ones. He further assumed that couples share
a ranking of regions. Despite these strong restrictions on the couples' preferences,
Cantala [2004] exhibited a couples market that fails to have a stable matching.
3.6. Large Markets
Very recently, Kojima, Pathak and Roth [2010] analyzed data from the Association
of Psychology Postdoctoral and Internship Centers (APPIC) matching program.
They found that (i) the preferences of the overwhelming majority of couples violate
weak responsiveness, but nonetheless (ii) there exists a stable matching for each of
the nine years of the psychology market for which they had data. To explain the
stability of the psychologists market (and similar large markets), Kojima, Pathak
and Roth [2010] built a model for large markets with couples. Using stylized facts
from the psychologist market, they placed several conditions on the sequence of
random markets (indexed by n, which is the number of hospitals) of growing size
(in order to study limit behavior). Informally,27
 the length of students' preference lists does not grow when the number of
market participants grows;
27See Kojima, Pathak and Roth [2010] for details, in particular regarding possible relaxations of
the assumptions.
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 the number of single students does not grow much faster than the number
of hospitals. Moreover, the number of couples does not grow at the same
rate as the number of hospitals and instead grows at the slower rate of
O(na), where 0  a  12 ;
 the capacity of each hospital is bounded;
 the popularity of dierent hospitals (measured by the probability of being
listed by doctors as acceptable) does not vary too \much."
A crucial implication of the model is that if n is large enough then it is very likely
that there is a large number of hospitals with vacant positions (even if there are more
students than positions). This implication partially drives their rst main result:
the probability that there exists a stable matching converges to 1 when the number
of hospitals n approaches innity. The proof of their rst main result consists of
showing that the probability that their \sequential couples algorithm" succeeds (i.e.,
nds a stable matching) converges to one as the market size approaches innity.28
Next, Kojima, Pathak and Roth [2010] proceeded with an analysis of the in-
centives for manipulation in a market with couples, employing a mechanism that
builds on the sequential couples algorithm.29 They considered a Bayesian game in
which single students, couples, and hospitals submit their preference lists to the
clearinghouse. Under conditions (on a sequence of Bayesian games) that are very
similar to the ones in their rst main result, they established their second main
result: for any  > 0, truth-telling is an -Bayes-Nash equilibrium when the number
of hospitals n approaches innity.
Ashlagi, Braverman and Hassidim [2011] studied a model very similar to Kojima,
Pathak and Roth [2010], but with a weaker notion of stability. They allowed the
number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate: n1  where  > 0. Under this
assumption, they established that the probability that a stable matching exists
approaches 1 as the market grows large. To obtain their result, they introduced a
new matching algorithm called \sorted deferred acceptance." Moreover, under the
induced mechanism, truth-telling is an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium for any
large enough market. A key element in their analysis is the selection of a particular
sequence of proposals by couples that is least likely to generate existence problems.
Furthermore, their simulation and theory suggest that asymptotic existence is likely
to fail if the number of couples grows proportionally to the market size. Therefore,
the growth rate n1  is probably the highest one can achieve without running into
the non-existence of stable matchings.
28The sequential couples algorithm is based on the deferred acceptance algorithm and incorporates
applications by couples. Obviously, the sequential couples algorithm may fail to nd a stable
matching (even if there exists one).
29The dierence is that the mechanism has to specify some matching when the sequential couples
algorithm fails (to nd a stable matching).
17
4. Concluding Discussion and Outlook
Studies in the last decade have answered many questions regarding the presence
of couples in matching markets. Most of these studies are theoretical, but many of
them are motivated by empirical ndings. Given the possible non-existence of stable
matchings, computational experiments have been very helpful as well to measure
and compare the performance of algorithms that aim to nd a stable matching
whenever one exists.
Obviously, there is still a long road to a full understanding of the complexities
introduced by the presence of married couples. One theoretical question is how to
weaken stability to obtain an appropriate non-empty solution. For instance, the
weak stability proposed in Klijn and Masso [2003] does not seem adequate: Klaus
and Klijn [2005] showed that most of their negative results hold even for weak
stability. A helpful tool in such an analysis could be a concept of comparing (un-
stable) matchings according to the number of blocking pairs they admit or number
of agents involved in blocking pairs (see e.g. Biro, Manlove and Mittal [2010]), or
other measures like the one developed by Biermann [2011].
Another important issue that has received relatively little attention is the match-
ing of couples in decentralized markets. To the best of our knowledge, Klaus and
Klijn [2007] is the only paper that explicitly dealt with it. They showed that on their
restricted preference domain, under rather mild conditions a decentralized market
converges to a stable matching with probability 1. They also showed that in general,
even if a stable matching exists, such convergence is not always possible (see also
Example 4). In order to obtain positive results it therefore seems necessary to study
and model the behavior of couples in more specic real-life decentralized markets.
To a large extent, the literature on matching with couples belongs to the rather
new eld of market design. \Economic engineering" (coined by Roth [2002]), how-
ever, typically takes a trial and error approach, in which laboratory experiments
play a prominent role. We are not aware of any laboratory experiments that deal
with couples in matching markets, but they would be crucial in the study of couples'
preference formation and decision making.
The analysis of matching markets with couples is a rst small step in understand-
ing markets with complementarities. Until recently, these markets were dicult to
tackle. However, the tools developed in large markets studies can turn out to be very
helpful. An important example of this is a result obtained by Ashlagi, Braverman
and Hassidim [2011]. They adapted their analysis of large markets with couples
to a more general worker-rm model studied by Roth and Sotomayor [1990]. Roth
and Sotomayor (1990) proved that if rms' preferences are substitutable a stable
matching exists; and even if only one rm does not have substitutable preferences,
a stable matching need not exist. Ashlagi, Braverman and Hassidim [2011] showed
that if the market is large and random, as long as the number of rms that have
non-substitutable preferences is growing at a near-linear rate, the probability that
a stable matching exists tends to 1 as the market size tends to innity.
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To put our survey in perspective, we note that there are some new interdis-
ciplinary research directions that incorporate our particular subject. Algorithmic
mechanism design (see e.g. Nisan and Ronen [1999]) is one of them. In both the
economics and computer science communities it is now widely accepted that a mech-
anism can be successful only if both strategic and algorithmic considerations form
part of the design process. More general interdisciplinary areas such as algorithmic
game theory (see e.g. Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos and Vazirani [2007]) and compu-
tational social choice (see e.g. Chevaleyre, Endriss, Lang and Maudet [2007]) have
already shown the fruitful interaction between economics and computer science.
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